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/ 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
CONTEXT: CAN IMMINENT HARM TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH? 
Amy Lamberski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is 10:00 p.m. You, a diligent investigator employed with your 
state's office of environmental protection, have decided to remain at 
the office this evening to catch up on some paperwork. At 10:05 p.m., 
the telephone rings and a reliable informant tells you that a trailer 
heavily laden with toxic chemicals will be departing from a local 
warehouse sometime between tonight and tomorrow morning.1 The 
transport, according to the informant, was arranged hastily by the 
warehouse operator upon his discovery that the warehouse was sched-
uled for inspection by your office tomorrow afternoon. 
Alarmed by the call, you thank the informant and immediately 
telephone the local fire department to arrange for surveillance of the 
warehouse. You offer to participate in the surveillance, and during 
your shift you observe workers loading fifty-five gallon drums onto a 
trailer. You watch as a tractor attaches the trailer and exits the 
premises. 
You follow the tractor-trailer for several miles, reasonably sure that 
the trailer contains hazardous chemicals, but unsure whether the 
drums containing those chemicals have been secured properly. The 
* Articles Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 The facts of this hypothetical are drawn loosely from Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 770-71 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992), em. denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
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tractor-trailer proceeds down a bumpy dirt road. You envision those 
fifty-five gallon drums sliding around in the trailer, careening into one 
another. Your concern about a possible toxic release multiplies with 
every bump. The tractor-trailer finally parks in a lot filled with other 
trailers. The driver detaches the trailer, and departs in the tractor. 
Overwhelmed now by the thought that hazardous toxins could at that 
very moment be leaking from the fifty-five gallon drums, you ap-
proach the lot to take a look inside the trailer. 
Question: if you look inside the newly arrived trailer, are you effec-
tuating an illegal search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution?2 After all, you have no search warrant.3 
But if you act soon, you may be able to prevent or control a dangerous 
toxic leak. Given the circumstances, should you look inside the trailer? 
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable" searches 
and seizures, and guarantees that no search warrants will issue with-
out probable cause.4 The United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that searches conducted without a warrant that do not fall into 
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement are per se unrea-
sonable.5 There are, however, at least six exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.6 One such exception exists where authorities proceed 
upon requisite probable cause, but are prevented by exigent circum-
stances from obtaining a warrant prior to a criminal search.7 
2 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and guaran-
tees that no warrants will issue, except upon probable cause. See U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. 
IV. 
3 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring a 
search warrant for all criminal searches that do not fall under one of a narrow set of exceptions. 
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967»; Jacqueline J. Warner, Note, The Exigent Circumstance Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement of the Fourth Amendment: What Criteria Must Be Met?, 33 How. L.J. 425, 425-26 
(1991). 
4 U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. IV. 
5 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); see also Warner, supra note 3, at 
425-26. 
6 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987) (no warrant required if pervasively 
regulated industry); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (no warrant required 
if search conducted incident to a lawful arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (no warrant required if search authorized by voluntary consent); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (no warrant required if seizing items in plain view); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (warrant requirement will not be excused where no 
exigent circumstances exist); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (no warrant 
required if searching an automobile). For detailed treatment of each exception, see Project, The 
Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeals 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 877, 877-952 (1993) [hereinafter Annual Review]. 
7 See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456. The term "exigent circumstances" has come to encompass 
a varied array of situations which will be discussed in Sections II and III, infra of this Comment. 
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This Comment explores whether the threat of imminent harm to 
the environment qualifies as an exigency that could validate a war-
rantless search.8 Section II provides a basic overview of the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement. Section III reviews the contours 
of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, 
focusing on those cases where the exigency was imminent danger of 
some sort. Section IV outlines the Supreme Court and lower federal 
court decisions that have developed the exigent circumstances excep-
tion, and summarizes in detail two state court opinions that have 
discussed imminent harm to the environment as a potential exigent 
circumstance. Section V discusses current attitudes of the judicial and 
legislative branches towards preventing imminent harm to the envi-
ronment. Finally, Section VI assesses the feasibility of expanding the 
exigent circumstances exception to encompass efforts to prevent im-
minent environmental harm. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects individual interests in privacy 
against unjustified intrusions by law enforcement officials.9 Before 
finding the Fourth Amendment applicable in a given case, a court 
must decide that an individual or business has an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as valid.Io Where a valid 
privacy interest exists, the Fourth Amendment provides protection 
through both the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause.ll The 
reasonableness clause mandates that all searches be reasonable.I2 The 
warrant clause guarantees that no search warrants will issue except 
upon probable cause.I3 
8 Although there exist several other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment which might be applied in a given case, the scope of this Comment is limited to the 
application of the exigent circumstances exception. 
9 Donna Mussio, Note, Drawing the Line Between Administrative and Criminal Searches: 
Defining the "Object a/the Search" in Environmental Inspections, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
185, 187 (1990). The Fourth Amendment was written largely in response to eighteenth-century 
British writs of assistance that permitted searches unlimited in scope, without judicial supervi-
sion, and without probable cause. Id. at 187 n.12. 
10 Id. at 187 n.13. 
n Id. at 187. See U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. IV, which states "[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... " 
12 See U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. IV. 
13Id. 
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The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the warrant 
clause of the Fourth Amendment as requiring a search warrant for 
all criminal searches that do not fall into a set of explicitly delineated 
exceptions.14 The Court's concern is that police engaged in the some-
what competitive enterprise of uncovering violations of the law may 
not exercise the discretion necessary to prevent unconstitutional in-
vasions into the lives of private citizens.15 The warrant requirement 
effectively interposes the impartial judgment of a magistrate between 
police officers and the premises those officers desire to search as part 
of a criminal investigation.16 
Despite the Supreme Court's expressed advocacy of the warrant 
process, however, the Court has created a number of exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.17 For instance, the Court has upheld war-
rantless searches of automobiles18 and of facilities in pervasively regu-
lated industries19 based on the notion that there is a lower expectation 
of privacy associated with those areas.20 The Court has also created 
exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches authorized by 
voluntary consent,21 searches incident to a lawful arrest,22 and searches 
conducted under exigent circumstances.23 The remainder of this Com-
ment focuses on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
III. THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION 
As early as 1948, the Supreme Court recognized that sometimes 
there arise "exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the 
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may 
be contended that a magistrate's warrant may be dispensed with."24 
14 See Warner, supra note 3, at 425-26. 
15 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). 
16 See id. 
17 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 877-952. 
18 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
19 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987). 
20 See id.; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. 
21 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
22 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
23 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). The exceptions listed are merely 
a sample. For detailed treatment of all of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement, see Annual Review, supra note 6, at 877-952. 
24 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); Comment, United States v. McDonald: 
The Exigent Circumstances Exception and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 20 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 407, 407--08 (1991) [hereinafter Comment]. 
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This recognition evolved into the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement.25 
The exigent circumstances exception vitiates the warrant require-
ment when two criteria are met: (1) the authorities engaged in a 
warrantless search had criminal probable cause to search; and (2) 
exigent circumstances existed which required immediate action and 
left no time to secure a search warrant.26 
A. Probable Cause 
Before applying the exigent circumstances exception, a court must 
be satisfied that the search at issue was supported by criminal prob-
able cause.27 In many Supreme Court cases dealing with exigent cir-
cumstances, the existence of probable cause appears to be unchallenged, 
and the Court explicitly deals only with the question of whether a 
sufficient exigency justified the search.28 However, in cases where the 
existence of probable cause to search is questionable, courts spend 
more time explicitly discussing this first requirement.29 
To meet the probable cause requirement, authorities engaged in a 
criminal search must have "reasonable grounds to believe" that their 
search will yield evidence of a particular crime and that therefore, an 
invasion of privacy is justified.30 Essential to the probable cause require-
ment is individualized suspicion (1) that a crime has been committed; and 
(2) that evidence of that crime will be discovered through the search.31 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that probable cause is a flexible 
concept.32 Judges and magistrates making the probable cause deter-
mination consider factors such as the truthfulness and the basis of 
knowledge of persons supplying information to criminal investigators, 
25 See Comment, supra note 24, at 407--08. 
26 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 902. 
2:1 See id. 
28 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298-99 (1967) (police who were informed that an 
armed robber entered a dwelling presumably had probable cause to search the dwelling); United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 48 (1951) (states conclusively that officers had "reason to believe" 
narcotics were unlawfully concealed in hotel room); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
455 (1948) (sound of adding machine presumably satisfies probable cause requirement). 
29 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (magistrate might have found 
probable cause, but no exigency justified the search); Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (discussing reasons for refusal to find probable cause), een. denied, _ 
U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
30 See Mussio, supra note 9, at 188. 
3! See id. at 188 n.16. 
32 [d. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983». 
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the likelihood of independent corroboration of the information, the 
level of detail and specificity in the proffered information, and the 
existence of any statements against the penal interests of the inform-
ant.33 None of these factors is conclusive-a deficiency as to one can 
be compensated for by a strong showing as to another.34 
Probable cause may be difficult to establish when authorities in-
itially rely on an anonymous tip.3!i In such cases, the authorities have 
no proof of the informant's credibility. Further, the information pro-
vided may not contain the level of specificity or detail necessary to 
provide alternative grounds for a finding of trustworthiness.36 
In a small number of cases applying the exigent circumstances 
exception, the criminal probable cause requirement is waived com-
pletely.37 These cases involve circumstances in which law enforcement 
officials enter private premises without a warrant for the purpose of 
preventing or alleviating some urgent "civil emergency," such as a 
fire.38 While doing so, the authorities stumble upon evidence of a crime 
that is later sought to be introduced at a criminal trial.39 In such cases, 
despite the absence of probable cause to search, courts have held that 
the criminal evidence is admissible under the exigent circumstances 
exception.40 Two examples of this type of case, Wayne v. United States41 
and United States v. Echegoyen,42 are discussed in more detail below.43 
B. Exigent Circumstances 
Where probable cause exists, a court will uphold a warrantless 
search under the exigent circumstances exception if the state can 
prove that some exigency made the search imperative, and left no 
33 See id. at 189; Gates, 462 U.S. at 231; RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 580-81 (2d ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1991) [hereinafter 
ALLEN & KUHNS]. 
34 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31. 
35 Mussio, supra note 9, at 189-90; see, e.g., Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1992) (concluding that search based on anonymous tip was not supported by probable 
cause), em. denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
36 See, e.g., Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 774-75. 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1986); Wayne v. United 
States, 318 F.2d 205, 211-12 (D.C. Cir.), em. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). 
38 See Wayne, 318 F.2d at 211-12; Mark Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investiga-
tions: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV. 493, 508 (1988) (discussing 
"emergency doctrine"). 
39 See, e.g., Eehegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1280; Wayne, 318 F.2d at 211-12. 
40 See, e.g., Eehegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1280; Wayne, 318 F.2d at 211-12. 
41 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). 
42 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1986). 
43 See infra Section IV. 
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time to secure a warrant.44 "Exigent circumstances" describe those 
instances in which a search must be conducted "now or never,"45 such 
as where a suspect is fleeing the scene moments after the commission 
of an offense,46 where the likelihood that evidence will be lost, de-
stroyed, or moved from the jurisdiction is imminent,47 or where there 
is a need to protect human life or property or to avoid serious injury.48 
No uniform test exists for determining the presence or absence of 
exigent circumstances-courts generally proceed on a case-by-case 
basis.49 Some courts emphasize subjective factors, such as whether the 
authorities who conducted a search "reasonably believed" at the time 
they acted that an exigency existed that required immediate action.50 
Other decisions do not consider the subjective perceptions of the 
authorities who conducted the search, but instead engage in an objec-
tive totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of whether an exigency 
existed at the search's inception.51 
44 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) ("We cannot be true to [the 
constitutional warrant requirement] and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a 
showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of 
the situation made the course imperative."). 
45 See Cheryl Johnson, Note, With Probable Cause to Search But With Exigent Circum-
stances, 26 How. L.J. 946, 948 (1983). 
46 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (upholding warrantless search of a 
house that fleeing suspect had entered). 
47 See, e.g., McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455 (suggesting that no warrant is required if property is 
in the process of destruction or likely to be destroyed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
153 (1925) (recognizing mobility as an exigency that justifies a warrantless search). But see 
Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 653 N.E.2d 579, 585 (Mass. 1995) (mobility of evidence is not an 
exigency where long-term surveillance provided notice to authorities that removal would occur 
on particular date). 
48 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1967). When the exigent circumstances 
exception involves imminent danger to life, health, or property, it sometimes is referred to as 
the "emergency doctrine." See Hardin, supra note 38, at 508. 
49 Warner, supra note 3, at 426 (citing United States v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1976) 
and United States v. McKinney, 477 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (each stating that a court must 
look to the facts of a particular case to determine whether there was an exigency)). 
50 See, e.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 ("the [F]ourth [A]mendment does not bar police officers 
from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person 
within is in need of immediate aid"); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292, 296 (1973) (exigent 
circumstances justified search of fingernails for skin, blood cells, and fabric when police reason-
ably believed suspect had knowledge of police suspicion creating motive to destroy evidence); 
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (exigent circumstances justify 
warrantless search where police reasonably believe suspect is armed and reasonably believe 
suspect is on premises searched); see also Johnson, supra note 45, at 948 (stating that, in 
applying the exigent circumstances exception, courts generally will look to the surrounding 
circumstances as perceived by the police at the time of the warrantless search). 
51 See, e.g., Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (despite evidence that 
authority conducting search believed exigency existed, court looked at record objectively and 
denied existence of exigent circumstances), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
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The United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue 
whether the proper standard for determining the existence of an 
exigency is subjective or objective, rather, the Court has considered 
both types of evidence.52 Interestingly, those Supreme Court decisions 
that give weight to the subjective beliefs of the authorities as to 
whether an exigency was present when they conducted a warrantless 
search almost invariably result in a conclusion that the search is 
justified under the exigent circumstances exception.53 
IV. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXCEPTION 
A. United States Supreme Court and United States Courts of 
Appeals Decisions 
One of the earliest cases acknowledging the existence of the exigent 
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment is McDonald v. United States.fJ4 In McDonald, petitioners McDon-
ald and Washington challenged the police's warrantless entry into a 
rooming house in which McDonald had rented a room.55 The police 
suspected that McDonald and Washington were operating an illegal 
lottery and had kept both men under surveillance for nearly two 
months.56 On the day of the challenged search, police officers be-
lieved that they heard the sound of an adding machine emitting from 
McDonald's room. 57 Deducing from that sound that an illegal lottery 
was being conducted inside, the police entered McDonald's room and 
observed McDonald and Washington operating a lottery.58 The officers 
arrested both men and seized machines, papers, and money.59 These 
articles were admitted into evidence at the defendants' trial for op-
eration of an illegal lottery, and the defendants were convicted.60 On 
appeal, the defendant-petitioners argued that the search which un-
covered the evidence leading to their conviction was conducted with-
52 Compare Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1966) 
(considering subjective beliefs of authorities) with Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30,34-35 (1969) 
and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948) (no consideration of subjective 
beliefs of authorities; focusing on objective idea of "exigency"). 
53 See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299-300. 
54 335 U.S. at 454. 
55 See id. at 451. 
56 See id. at 452. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 452-53. 
59 See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453. 
60 See id. at 451. 
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out a warrant and was therefore unlawfu1.61 The prosecution coun-
tered that the petitioners' commission of a crime in the presence of 
the officers constituted an exigent circumstance which justified the 
warrantless search.62 
The Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's argument.63 While 
recognizing that the sound of the adding machine arguably provided 
probable cause to search McDonald's room, the Court held that no 
exigency existed to justify the warrantless search.64 The Court stated 
that the police officers in this case did not respond to any emergency.65 
Further, no other compelling circumstances existed to validate the 
search-the petitioners were not fleeing or seeking escape nor was 
the relevant evidence in the process of destruction or likely to be 
destroyed.66 In light of the absence of any "exigencies" that would 
have made the officers' course of action imperative, the Court refused 
to uphold the warrantless search.67 
Three years later, the Supreme Court again declined to uphold a 
warrantless search based on exigent circumstances in United States 
v. Jeffers.68 In Jeffers, the police suspected that the defendant unlaw-
fully had stored narcotics in his aunt's hotel room.69 With probable 
cause to search, but without a warrant for search or arrest, police 
officers entered the hotel room, searched it, and seized the narcotics 
they discovered.70 At trial, the defendant argued that the seizure of 
the narcotics was invalid due to the officers' failure to procure a search 
warrant.71 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed.72 The Court noted 
that there was no threat of violence or imminent destruction of the 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 454. 
63 See id. 
64 See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455. 
65 [d. at 454. 
66 [d. at 455; see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (warrantless search is 
not valid where no suspect was fleeing, search was of permanent-not movable-premises, and 
no evidence was threatened with removal or destruction). 
67 See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56. The Court declared: 
[d. 
[w]e are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high 
function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a 
magistrate between the citizens and the police .... We cannot ... excuse the absence 
of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the consti-
tutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made the course imperative. 
68 Johnson, supra note 45, at 950; see United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951). 
69 See Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 48. 
70 See id. at 48, 50. 
71 See id. at 49. 
72 See id. at 52. 
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evidence.73 Moreover, since the apartment was empty at the time of 
the search, the police could have prevented any destruction or removal 
of the evidence contained therein merely by guarding the door.74 Thus, 
the Court held that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the 
warrantless search.75 
In both Jeffers and McDonald v. United States, the Supreme Court 
declined to find exigent circumstances.76 However, the Supreme Court 
and lower courts have upheld warrantless searches based on the ex-
istence of exigent circumstances in a range of different contexts.77 Courts 
have sanctioned warrantless searches based on exigency where there 
was a likelihood that evidence would be destroyed or removed from 
the jurisdiction,78 where police were in hot pursuit of a suspect and 
had probable cause to arrest,79 where authorities reasonably believed 
a suspect would flee the jurisdiction before a warrant could be ob-
tained,80 or where those who conducted the search reasonably per-
ceived a threat of imminent danger to human life or property.81 
Of these examples, the "imminent danger" cases, such as the hypo-
thetical hazardous substance situation posed at the opening of this 
Comment, are most applicable in the environmental context. Wayne 
v. United States82 was one of the earliest cases to elaborate on the idea 
73 See id. 
74 Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 52; see also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (no exigency exists 
where there is no one present to destroy the evidence). 
75 Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 52. 
76 See id.; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948). 
77 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 902-D4. 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,43 (1976) (warrantless search justified where 
any delay would result in destruction of narcotics evidence). Of the destruction or removal-of-
evidence cases, the most prevalent involve narcotics charges. See Annual Review, supra note 
6, at 902-D3. Due to the ease with which narcotics can be destroyed, criminal investigations 
involving narcotics often result in a warrantless search or seizure which later is upheld under 
the exigent circumstances exception. See id. If long-term surveillance has provided authorities 
with reasonable notice that evidence will be removed on a certain day, however, the exigent 
circumstances exception will not vitiate the warrant requirement. See Commonwealth v. Krisco 
Corp., 653 N.E.2d 579, 585 (Mass. 1995) (where surveillance revealed pattern of illegal waste 
disposal, failure to obtain warrant between dumping of waste and removal of materials dumped 
on a particular day was not excused by exigent circumstances). 
79 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1966) (warrantless search valid where 
police in hot pursuit and had probable cause to arrest armed robbery suspect). 
80 Compare United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1443 (9th Cir.) (warrantless entry justified 
where defendant's possession of police scanner and potential knowledge of accomplice's arrest 
created risk that defendant would flee), eert. denied, 502 U.S. 1062 (1991) with McDonald, 335 
U.S. at 454 (no exigent circumstances where suspects were busily engaged in lottery venture 
and thus not likely to flee). 
81 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 902. 
82 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). 
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that imminent danger to human life or property could constitute an 
exigency that vitiates the warrant requirement.83 In Wayne, police 
officers on routine patrol were instructed to check on a report of an 
"unconscious woman."84 Upon the officers' arrival at the house in 
which the woman allegedly lay, the police knocked several times, 
identified themselves as police officers, and requested entry.85 The 
officers, however, received no response.86 After unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to obtain master keys to the residence, the police officers broke 
down the door and entered.87 Inside, they found the body of a deceased 
girl and other evidence that eventually led to the conviction of Lewis 
L. Wayne for an attempted abortion terminating in death.88 On appeal, 
Wayne argued that the evidence gathered against him was the fruit 
of an illegal warrantless search.89 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement justified the police officers' search.90 
According to the court, warrants are not required to break into a 
burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a 
shooting, or to bring emergency aid to an injured person.91 The need 
to protect or preserve life and to avoid serious injury is justification 
for what otherwise would be illegal absent an exigency or emer-
gency.92 
The Wayne court recognized that a balancing of interests is in-
volved in determining whether an exigency can validate a warrantless 
search. The court stated: 
[t]he appraisal of exigent circumstances ... presents difficult and 
delicate problems. These cases do not arise in the calm that per-
vades a courtroom or library. They are rarely if ever seen by 
courts except in cases where criminal activity has been uncovered 
by the challenged police actions. . . . The business of policemen 
and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the 
report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police 
83 See id. at 211-13. 
84 See id. at 212-13. 
85 See id. at 207. 
86 See id. 
87 See Wayne, 318 F.2d at 207. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. at 208. 
90 See id. at 213-14. 
91 [d. at 212; see, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (plurality opinion) (war-
rantless entry justified when building was aflame); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) 
(warrantless entry of burning building is valid). 
92 Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212. 
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tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial 
process .... Evidence of a fire or of escaping gas would warrant 
public authority to enter by any available means .... That such 
an entry would be an intrusion is undoubted but here we reach 
the balancing of interests and needs.93 
On the facts of Wayne, the court noted, the police were instructed to 
check on a report of an "unconscious woman" and could not assume 
the woman was dead.94 Swift response was essential. 95 Had the police 
paused for a warrant and risked the possibility that the woman might 
die while papers were drawn, their actions surely would have merited 
censure.96 The interest in protecting life and property superseded 
individual interests in privacy in this case.97 Thus, the court concluded, 
the officers' warrantless entry was justified.98 
Addressing the question of probable cause almost as an afterthought, 
the Wayne court stated that while the police may have had reasonable 
grounds to believe a crime had been committed in the apartment, the 
record was unclear.99 The court concluded, however, that a "civil emer-
gency" justified the entry, and that the evidence of a crime that the 
police had observed incidentally while responding to such emergency 
need not be suppressed.loo The Wayne case thus represents a depar-
ture from the usual rule that criminal searches conducted under exi-
gent circumstances are valid only when supported by probable cause.lOl 
The United States Supreme Court discussed imminent danger to 
humans as an exigent circumstance in Warden v. Hayden. 102 In Hay-
den, police officers had probable cause to search a private home for a 
robbery suspect.103 Moreover, the police had reason to believe the 
suspect was armed.104 Several police officers entered and searched the 
home without a warrant.105 One officer discovered the suspect in an 
upstairs bedroom.lo6 Meanwhile, other officers searched a toilet tank 
93 [d. at 211-12. 
94 [d. at 212-13. 
95 See id. at 213. 
96 [d. 
97 See Wayne, 318 F.2d at 214. 
98 See id. at 212-14. 
99 See id. at 212. 
100 See id. at 212-14. 
101 See supra Section IILA. 
102 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
103 See id. at 297-98. 
104 See id. at 298. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
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and found two guns.107 Another officer searched the washing machine 
in the cellar and discovered articles of clothing that matched the 
description of those worn by the man who fled the scene of the crime.lOS 
These items and others were seized and introduced against the de-
fendant at his trial for armed robbery.lo9 
The Supreme Court held that the exigencies of the situation in 
Hayden justified the warrantless search and that the evidence seized 
was admissible. l1° According to the Court, "the Fourth Amendment 
does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investiga-
tion if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of 
others."111 When police reasonably believe that the safety of law en-
forcement officials or the general public is threatened, they may enter 
a premises and search for a suspect before a warrant is obtained.112 In 
Hayden, the Court stated that the police acted reasonably when they 
entered the house and searched for a man fitting the description they 
had been given and for weapons he had used in the robbery and might 
use against them.1l3 
In addition to searches for people, such as victims114 and suspects,115 
an imminent danger exigency can justify searches of places where law 
enforcement authorities reasonably believe inherently dangerous items 
are presentY6 Weapons, such as handguns, qualify as inherently dan-
gerous items.ll7 Similarly, the suspected presence of a bomb may 
justify a warrantless search. l1s 
Other imminent dangers also may constitute exigent circumstances. 
For instance, even where a fire has not yet begun, an imminent fire 
107 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. at 298-99. 
112 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99; Annual Review, supra note 6, at 904. 
113 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298. 
114 See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212-14 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 
(1963). 
115 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99. 
116 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 904---D5. 
117 See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (warrantless search for gun in trunk 
of impounded car valid when arresting officers reasonably believed suspect carried weapon); 
United States v. Antwine, 873 F.2d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir. 1989) (warrantless search valid when 
police knew handgun was in house where children would be left alone after defendant was 
arrested). 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 1988) (warrantless search 
of luggage valid when police knew bomb was in luggage on commercial flight). 
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hazard can create an exigency sufficient to justify the warrantless 
entry of a building to eliminate the hazard.ll9 In United States v. 
Echegoyen, for example, the warrantless entry of police deputies into 
a home from which the smell of ether emitted was upheld under the 
exigent circumstances exception.120 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the officers' concern over a 
potential fire hazard justified the warrantless search, despite the fact 
that the officers also suspected-and later discovered-that illicit 
drug activity was taking place within the home.121 The court noted 
with approval that "the officers acted out of concern for the safety of 
the area," and the court further emphasized that the officers had 
limited their search to securing suspects and reducing the fire dan-
ger.l22 The court was not persuaded by the defendant's argument that 
the claimed exigent circumstances were a pretext, and the real pur-
pose of the search was to "bust" the suspected narcotics activity.l23 
The officers' behavior upon entering the dwelling clearly was aimed 
at reducing the hazards of fire and explosion.l24 Thus, the search was 
justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.125 
As has been illustrated, courts have upheld warrantless searches 
based on exigency in various factual contexts.126 Where the primary 
purpose for a search is to further a criminal investigation, courts 
require a showing of both criminal probable cause and sufficient exi-
gency before evidence will be admitted under the exigent circum-
stances exception.127 Where authorities respond to a civil emergency, 
however, and the primary purpose for conducting a search is to pro-
tect life or property, the probable cause requirement does not prevent 
119 Annual Review, supra note 6, at 906--07. Compare United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 
1271, 1278--79 (9th Cir. 1986) (warrantless entry justified when serious fire hazard required 
immediate action) with United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1988) (warrantless 
entry not valid despite presence of inherently volatile chemicals on premises because officer 
knew that suspect was not at home and that chemicals had been stored there without incident 
for at least two weeks). 
120 See Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1274, 1278--79. 
121 See id. at 1278. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. at 1279. 
124 See id. at 1278--79. 
125 See Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1278--79. 
126 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 902-04. 
127 See id. at 902. 
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the admission of evidence that authorities discover incidentally dur-
ing the course of their search.128 
B. Mullins129 and Denune:130 Application of the Exigent 
Circumstances Exception Where the Exigency Is Imminent Harm 
to the Environment 
Situations that pose an imminent threat of harm to humans or to 
property commonly qualify as exigencies sufficient to vitiate the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.131 But what about circumstances 
that pose an imminent threat of harm to the environment? At least 
two state courts have discussed the possibility that a warrantless 
search of private premises could be upheld under the exigent circum-
stances exception if imminent harm to the environment was threat-
ened at the time of the search.132 
In Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., decided by the Louisiana 
Court of Appeal in 1989, an owner of oilfield production facilities 
sought review of a Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) 
order that assessed penalties for impermissible discharges discovered 
during several warrantless inspections of the owner's premises.133 On 
appeal, the owner argued that the statutory scheme that authorized 
the warrantless inspection of his premises violated the United States 
Constitution because the scheme did not honor the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement.134 
The statute in question authorized warrantless inspections of all 
facilities subject to certain environmental regulations.135 The statute 
128 See Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1278--79; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 211-12 (D.C. 
Cir.), cen. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). 
129 Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
130 Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), cen. denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 
289 (1993). 
131 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 902-04. 
132 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775; Mullins, 549 So.2d at 877. 
133 See Mullins, 549 So.2d at 872. After receiving complaints from the Office of Conservation 
and at least one private citizen, the DEQ had made several visits to the owner's property and 
observed persisting evidence of oil discharges and spillages. See id. at 873. For instance, during 
one inspection, a DEQ official found that a valve on a glycol unit had been left open, from which 
discharge was seeping, oilfield waste was seeping from a burn pit and discharge was escaping 
from a reserve pit, one reserve pit had an orange color attributable to the presence of emulsified 
oil, and a pit levee was broken, causing oil to escape into an adjacent swamp. See id. at 873-74. 
134 See id. at 875. 
135 See id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2012 (West 1989». 
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also codified effectively the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement by providing for unannounced "special inspec-
tions" based on the presence of exigent circumstances.l36 The statute 
defined "exigent circumstances" as "imminent danger to the environ-
ment or health."137 
The Louisiana Court of Appeal upheld the statute.l38 First, the 
court noted that the appellant-owner's facilities were part of a "per-
vasively regulated industry," and thus the owner's expectation of 
privacy was limited.139 Second, the statute's codification of the exigent 
circumstances exception, including the definition of exigency as a 
threat of imminent harm to the environment, was justified by Louisi-
ana's substantial interest in improving the health and welfare of its 
citizens through environmental-control regulations.l40 The court stated 
that an industrial owner "cannot help but know that its facilities will 
be subject not only to periodic inspections, but also to special inspec-
tions whenever an exigency exists."141 
In discussing the "exigency" provision, the court was impressed by 
the fact that the statute required a "reasonable belief' that exigent 
conditions exist, and limited the scope of warrantless inspections to 
those matters reasonably related to the exigent condition.l42 The Mullins 
court's validation of the Louisiana statute suggests that, at least 
within pervasively regulated industries, the threat of imminent envi-
ronmental harm qualifies as an exigency that can justify an unan-
nounced warrantless search.l43 
In a more recent case, Ohio v. Denune, the State of Ohio unsuccess-
fully attempted to defend a warrantless search of private premises 
136 See id. at 875-76. 
137 Louisiana's statute provided, in pertinent part, that "[w]henever there exists an imminent 
danger to the environment or health ... the secretary [of the DEQ] may cause a special 
inspection to be made of the facility where such exigent conditions are reasonably believed to 
exist." See id. at 876-77 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2012). The statute further provided 
that any warrantless inspection made pursuant to the terms aforementioned would not preclude 
the prosecution of any violations discovered in the course of the investigation. See id. 
138 See Mullins, 549 So.2d at 877. 
139 See id. at 875-76 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987». The court's 
rationale commonly is associated with the ''pervasively regulated industry exception" to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement formally recognized in Burger. See Burger, 482 U.S. 
at 699-703 (no warrant required if premises are part of pervasively regulated industry). A 
detailed analysis of this exception is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
140 See Mullins, 549 So.2d at 877. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
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where environmental harm seemed imminent at the time of the search.l44 
The Denune case involves circumstances almost identical to those in 
the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Comment.145 The Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) received an anonymous 
tip that a trailer full of carcinogenic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBS)146 
would be removed from the Dixie Distributing, Inc. warehouse before 
a scheduled OEPA inspection of the warehouse premises the following 
day.147 The OEPA immediately arranged with a local fire department 
for joint surveillance of the warehouse.148 When two OEPA investiga-
tors arrived to begin their surveillance shift, the fire department 
officials already present stated that they had observed fifty-five gallon 
drums or transformers being loaded into the back of the suspect 
trailer. 149 
One of the OEPA investigators, William Palmer, followed the sus-
pect tractor-trailer when it left the warehouse.15o The tractor-trailer 
proceeded along a major highway for several miles before turning 
onto a bumpy dirt road.151 The dirt road led to a salvage yard where 
six other Dixie Distributing, Inc. trailers were parked.152 
After the driver detached the trailer containing the drums and 
departed in the tractor, Inspector Palmer conducted a visual inspec-
144 See Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 
114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
145 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
146 PCBs are the focus of extensive regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(ToSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2610-29 (1982). See Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 
13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379, 388 (1986). PCBs have been found to cause chloracne, skin 
and eye irritations, nausea, edema of the face and hands, liver disorders, as well as digestive 
disorders and abdominal pain in persons chronically exposed to the chemical. [d. at 388 n.34. 
There is substantial experimental epidemiological evidence that PCBs pose a carcinogenic risk 
to humans. [d. Furthermore, PCBs are very persistent in the environment-they resist destruc-
tion by agents in nature. [d. PCBs accumulate in the tissues of humans, animals (especially fish), 
birds, and plants. [d. According to the EPA, PCBs, unless properly disposed of, will persist and 
work their ill effects upon mankind in the natural environment for generations to come. [d. 
(citing UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPPORT DOCUMENT VOLUN-
TARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: PCB MANUFACTURING, PROCESSING, DISTRI-
BUTION IN COMMERCE AND USE BAN REGULATION: ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS 2 (Apr. 
1979». 
147 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 770. 
148 See State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Butler County, Ohio at 
3, Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (No. 92-2281), cert. denied, _ U.S._, 
114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
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tion of the yard then contacted the caretaker to obtain consent to 
search the newly arrived trailer.153 Having obtained such consent, 
Inspector Palmer cut the padlock off the trailer and searched its 
interior.l54 Inside the trailer, Inspector Palmer found ten transformers 
containing PCBs and an unlabelled fifty-five gallon drum.155 The lids 
from the transformers had been removed, and oil was leaking from 
the seals.156 
Determining that the leaks inside the trailer did not require any 
immediate action, Palmer departed and obtained a warrant to search 
the other six trailers in the yard.157 Based on evidence gathered in 
these subsequent searches, Harry Denune, owner of Dixie Distribut-
ing, Inc., was convicted for illegal transportation, disposal, and stor-
age of hazardous waste, failure to evaluate waste, failure to conduct 
analysis of waste, failure to prepare a uniform waste manifest, crimi-
nal endangering, and illegal operation of a waste facility.158 
On appeal, Denune argued that the initial search conducted by 
Inspector Palmer violated the United States Constitution due to In-
spector Palmer's failure to secure a search warrant.159 Consequently, 
Denune argued, all the evidence garnered as a result of that search 
should have been suppressed at triaU60 Ohio countered Denune's ar-
gument by raising three exceptions to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement which could have justified Inspector Palmer's search: 
the consent exception, the automobile exception, and the exigent 
circumstances exception.161 
Before deciding whether any of the above-mentioned exceptions 
applied, the Ohio Court of Appeals addressed the issue of probable 
cause.162 The court pointed out that the only information Inspector 
Palmer possessed concerning the trailer had been conveyed by an 
anonymous caller whose reputation for truthfulness was not known.l63 
The information the caller provided, moreover, was not sufficiently 
specific to give rise to a valid suspicion of criminal activity.l64 Viewing 
153 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 770. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. at 770--71. 
157 See id. at 771. 
158 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 770. 
159 See id. at 768. 
160 See id. at 769. 
161 See id. at 774-77. 
162 See id. at 774-75. 
163 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 774-75; see also supra Section IILA. 
164 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 774-75. 
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the totality of the circumstances, the court held that Ohio had failed 
to prove that Inspector Palmer had probable cause to search the Dixie 
Distributing, Inc. trailer.165 
Despite the court's conclusion that the probable cause requirement 
had not been met, the court proceeded to examine the applicability of 
each of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment that had been raised by the state.166 In doing so, the court found 
each exception inapplicable.167 
First, the court held that the caretaker did not have authority to 
consent to the search on behalf of Denune.168 Thus, the court concluded 
that the consent exception did not apply.169 Second, the court found 
that the traditional justification for the automobile exception-mobil-
ity of evidence-was not present because the suspect trailer was 
detached from the tractor at the time of the search.170 The automobile 
exception, therefore, was also inapplicable.l7l Finally, the court con-
sidered whether any "other" exigencies might have validated Inspec-
tor Palmer's search.172 The court noted that the state had raised a 
concern regarding the potential hazard posed to the environment by 
the threat of leakage from the drums within the trailer.173 The court 
stated, however, that the situation encountered by Inspector Palmer 
did not present an exigent circumstance because there was no indica-
tion that harm to the environment was "imminent."174 The court rec-
ognized that the trailer was situated in a "vulnerable environmental 
area," and that the exterior of the trailer "was in poor condition," but 
stated conclusively that "there was no indication that immediate ac-
tion was necessary to prevent harm to the environment."175 Without 
further explanation, the court held that the exigent circumstances 
exception did not justify Inspector Palmer's search.176 
165 See id. at 775. 
166 See id. at 774-77. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 776. 
169 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 776. 
170 See id. at 775. 
171 See id. at 776. 
172 See id. at 775. 
173 See id. 
174 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775. 
175 See id. Based on Ohio's inability to persuade the Ohio Court of Appeals that Inspector 
Palmer's search was supported by probable cause and was justified by an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the court held that the evidence presented at trial 
should have been suppressed, and Denune's convictions were overturned. See id. at 777. 
176 See id. at 775. 
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Thus, state courts have been willing to address contentions that 
imminent harm to the environment qualifies as an exigency that may 
vitiate the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.177 Despite this willingness, how-
ever, no court yet has upheld explicitly under the exigent circum-
stances exception a warrantless search aimed at preventing imminent 
harm to the environment.l78 
V. PREVENTING IMMINENT HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
AS A NATIONAL PRIORITY 
In light of current governmental attitudes toward preventing en-
vironmental degradation, an expansion of the exigent circumstances 
exception towards that end may be inevitable. The public, courts, and 
legislatures have all recognized that the integrity of our environment 
is a matter of public interest.l79 Commentators assert that environ-
mental harm has replaced nuclear confrontation as the vital public 
issue.l8o Ingrained in this heightened environmental awareness is the 
perception that our government should act to prevent environmental 
harm before such harm occurs, rather than passively waiting for cata-
strophic environmental disaster.l8l 
Congress has taken a proactive approach to eliminating environ-
mental harm.l82 For example, Congress enacted a "cradle to grave" 
tracking statute called the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).l83 RCRA attempts to monitor the handling and treatment of 
hazardous wastes from the moment such wastes are created, with the 
177 See, e.g., id. at 775-76; Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 875 (La. Ct. App. 
1989). 
178 See supra notes 132-76 and accompanying text. 
179 Susan Verdicchio, Comment, Environmental Restoration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 171, 171 (1985). 
180 Donald Zillman & Peggy Gentles, NEPA's Evolution, The Decline of Substantive Review, 
20 ENVTL. L. 505, 530-31 (1990). 
181 See Tracey Cordes, Comment, Who Gets the Bill?: Determining Insurer's Duty to Defend 
Against Hazardous Waste Clean-up Costs Under General Liability Policies, 18 ENVTL. L. 931, 
947-48 (1988) (discussing insufficiency of harm-react responses to environmental harm). 
182 See David A. Rich, Comment, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An 
Examination of CERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 643, 646-48 (1986) 
(discussing forward-looking statutes enacted by Congress). 
183 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (Supp. II 1984). RCRA focuses on the responsible management of 
hazardous waste from the time of its creation to the time of its disposal. See id; Rich, supra note 
182, at 646-48 (discussing focus of RCRA). 
1996] WARRANTLESS ENVIRONMENTAL SEARCHES 347 
aim of encouraging caution and thus preventing environmental disas-
ters before they occur.l84 
Congress, moreover, has included "imminent danger" provisions in 
a number of federal environmental protection statutes, which purport 
to prevent harm that is threatened, but has not yet actually oc-
curred.185 Section 7003 of RCRA, for example, authorizes the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to seek a judicial order to restrain 
toxic leaks from hazardous waste sites.186 Section 7003 was amended 
in 1980 to extend its application to any hazardous waste site which 
may present-as opposed to is presenting-an imminent hazard.187 
The effectiveness of any legislative "imminent danger" provision, 
however, hinges upon judicial interpretation.188 Case law suggests 
that evidence of potential, rather than actual, harm is enough to 
establish "danger," and that "imminent" refers to the seriousness of 
the danger that is threatened.189 Even showing a risk of serious dan-
ger, however, as opposed to actual harm, poses formidable evidentiary 
problems.l90 
For instance, courts generally expect evidence ofthe specific effects 
that environmental pollution will have on humans, whether such ef-
fects are economic or health-related,191 Complaints alleging environ-
mental harm without presenting corresponding proof of how that 
harm will affect human lives seem, on the whole, to be less persuasive 
184 See Rich, supra note 182, at 646-48 (discussing intent of RCRA). 
185 See id. at 647 n.42 (citing section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 1984); section 
1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1976); section 504(a) of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (Supp. IV 1980); section 303 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 
U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. IV 1980); and section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982». 
186Id. at 647 (discussing RCRA's imminent harm provision). 
187Id. at 648 (citing Pub. L. 98-482 § 25 (1980». States have enacted similar provisions. See, 
e.g., Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 875-77 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2012, which contains an imminent harm provision). 
188 Raymond Rea, Comment, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Needfor a Different Statutory 
Approach, 12 ENVTL. L. 443, 452-53 (1982). 
189 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13-14 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (interpreting Clean Air Act 
(CAA», cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 
1975) (en bane) (interpreting Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA»; Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (interpreting Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA». 
190 See Rea, supra note 188, at 452-53 (discussing general difficulties in establishing "immi-
nent" harm under RCRA). 
191 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW 
AND SOCIETY 12-15 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER] (acknowledging the prevalence of human-cen-
tered notions of what constitutes environmental harm). 
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to courts than those that make that crucial link.192 Proving degrada-
tion of the environment as the definitive source of human health 
problems, however, is no easy task.193 Gathering proof is expensive 
and time-consuming,194 and even meticulously collected data detailing 
potential harm to the environment later may be considered unpersua-
sive in court.195 Thus, while Congress and state legislatures have 
mobilized in a proactive effort to prevent environmental harm, strict 
adherence to rules of evidence has at times prevented courts from 
following suit. l96 
VI. ANALYSIS: CAN IMMINENT HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
QUALIFY AS AN EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE THAT VITIATES THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT? 
The exigent circumstances exception traditionally has encompassed 
situations involving imminent danger to humans and/or to property,197 
but courts have never explicitly extended the exception to include 
circumstances involving imminent harm to the environment. The rela-
tively recent focus of Congress and state legislatures on preventing 
and criminalizing behaviors that pose the threat of imminent danger 
to the environment, however, suggests that an expansion of the exi-
gent circumstances exception purported towards achieving the same 
end is inevitable.198 Both Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc. and 
Ohio v. Denune, moreover, exhibit judicial willingness to entertain 
arguments advocating an expansion of the exigent circumstances ex-
ception to include situations where imminent harm to the environ-
ment is threatened.199 
Under the right circumstances, an imminent threat to the environ-
ment should qualify as an exigency that vitiates the Fourth Amend-
192 See id. at 28 (recognizing vital role of economic concerns in industrialized democracy such 
as United States); Cordes, supra note 181, at 947 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 
F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987»; Rea, supra note 188, at 452-53. 
193 See PLATER, supra note 191, at 203-D4; Cordes, supra note 181, at 947; Rea, supra note 
188, at 452-53. 
194 See PLATER, supra note 191, at 203. 
195 See Cordes, supra note 181, at 947; Rea, supra note 188, at 452-53. 
196 See Cordes, supra note 181, at 947; Rea, supra note 188, at 452-53. 
197 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 902. 
198 See Starr, supra note 146, at 385-94 (discussing judicial interpretation of congressional 
mandates). 
199 See Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 774 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 
114 S. Ct. 289 (1993); Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 876-77 (La. Ct. App. 
1989); see also supra Section IV.B. 
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ment warrant requirement. The preliminary inquiry in any case al-
ways will be whether there was requisite probable cause to search.2°O 
Beyond the probable cause consideration, several factors will affect a 
court's decision as to whether a threat of imminent harm to the 
environment is an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify a war-
rantless search. Among these factors are how courts choose to inter-
pret "imminent," the degree of emphasis courts place on the existence 
of statutory authority to search, and judicial willingness to protect the 
environment at the potential expense of individual privacy interests. 
A. Judicial Interpretation of "Imminent" 
How a court interprets "imminent" will greatly affect the determi-
nation whether threatened harm to the environment justifies a war-
rantless search in a given case.201 The evidentiary burden of proving 
"imminent" danger may be easy to overcome in cases where there is 
unquestionable evidence of potential far-reaching human and environ-
mental harm.202 Where an environmental threat occurs in a sparsely 
populated area and the potential harm is less dramatic, however, the 
required showing of imminent risk can be impossible to satisfy.203 This 
is particularly true in cases where courts ignore the perceptions of 
those who initiated a search and impose their own views of whether 
harm was imminent at the time of the search.204 
In Denune, for instance, the Ohio Court of Appeals seemed recep-
tive to the argument that imminent harm to the environment might, 
under the right circumstances, constitute an exigency that vitiates 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.205 Despite Inspector 
Palmer's assertions that he feared a chemical release, however, the 
200 See, e.g., Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 774. For discussion of the probable cause requirement 
generally, see supra Section III.A. 
201 See, e.g., Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775 (narrow interpretation of ''imminent'' that did not take 
into account perceptions of authorities engaged in the search resulted in court's conclusion that 
no exigency existed). 
202 See Rea, supra note 188, at 453. 
203 [d.; see, e.g., Cordes, supra note 181, at 947 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 
F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987)). In Maryland Casualty, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit refused to order indemnification where the state of Missouri acted proac-
tively, initiating cleanup of a contaminated groundwater supply before harm to humans or 
animals could be directly attributable to the toxic contamination. See Maryland Casualty Co., 
822 F.2d at 1354. 
204 See, e.g., Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775. 
205 See id. 
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court refused to acknowledge that the harm threatened in that case 
was imminent enough to constitute exigent circumstances.206 
The question is, to whom must the harm seem imminent-to the 
court in hindsight, or to the investigators faced with the decision 
whether to engage in a search? Traditional explications of the exigent 
circumstances rule are ambiguous on this issue.207 While some courts 
find the reasonable subjective beliefs of the investigators compel-
ling,208 the Denune court paid very little attention to Inspector Pal-
mer's contention that he honestly feared a toxic release.209 Instead, 
the Denune court, in hindsight and without explanation, asserted that 
there was no indication that immediate action was necessary to pre-
vent harm to the environment.210 In making this assertion, the court 
imposed its own assessment of the situation, and virtually ignored the 
investigator's impression at the time he made the decision to search 
the trailer.211 If the court had examined the investigator's assessment 
of the situation, rather than applying its own assessment, the court 
more likely would have found exigent circumstances in the Denune 
case.212 
The court in Denune not only imposed its own interpretation of 
"imminent" irrespective of the investigator's perceptions, but also 
interpreted "imminent" extremely narrowly.213 The court noted the 
fragile ecological character of the area where the trailer was parked, 
and acknowledged the dilapidated condition of the trailer's exterior.214 
Further, the court knew the trailer contained drums of highly toxic 
chemicals which had been transported hastily and well could have 
been leaking.215 The court, moreover, must have been aware of the 
difficulty of remediating chemical spills in general.216 Yet, despite all 
of these findings, the court held that harm to the environment was 
206 See id. 
207 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
208 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) ("the [F]ourth [A]mendment does not 
bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe 
that a person within is in need of immediate aid"); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (exigent circumstances justify warrantless search where police reasonably 
believe suspect is armed and reasonably believe suspect is on premises searched). 
209 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. (holding no exigent circumstances were present). 
213 See id. 
214 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775. 
215 See id. 
216 See PLATER, supra note 191, at 147-48 (discussing the exorbitant expense associated with 
cleaning up toxic spills). 
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not "imminent."217 Thus, the court avoided finding a substantial threat 
to the environment that could have justified Inspector Palmer's war-
rantless search of the Dixie Distributing, Inc. trailer.218 
What, if anything, would have prompted the court to acknowledge 
an imminent threat to the environment? Would the outcome have 
been different if Inspector Palmer had actually observed carcinogenic 
chemicals seeping into the ground before he decided to investigate 
further? Where a court draws the line for determining what consti-
tutes a substantial enough threat to justify immediate action will 
certainly affect its determination as to the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances.219 
Why did the Denune court draw the line where it did? Perhaps the 
court genuinely believed that the harm presented by the potential 
spilling of PCBs into a fragile ecosystem was not imminent enough to 
justify Inspector Palmer's entry. Or perhaps the Denune court, having 
already determined that Inspector Palmer lacked requisite probable 
cause to search,220 had predetermined its "exigency" inquiry. What-
ever the reason, the court's extremely narrow definition of "imminent," 
and the court's decision to ignore Inspector Palmer's perceptions as 
he embarked on his search, foreclosed application of the exigent cir-
cumstances exception in the Denune case.221 
The court in Denune did not, however, assert that imminent danger 
to the environment could never justify a warrantless search.222 The 
court merely held that the environmental harm threatened in that 
case was not imminent enough to compel application of the exigent 
circumstances exception.223 Conceivably, then, a more urgent threat 
to the environment could constitute an exigency which vitiates the 
warrant requirement. 
B. Statutory Authority to Conduct Warrantless Searches 
One obvious difference between Denune and Matter of Mullins & 
Pritchard, Inc. is that in Mullins, the challenged warrantless searches 
were conducted pursuant to statutory authority.224 The statutory scheme 
217 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775. 
218 See id. 
219 See, e.g., id. 
220 See id. at 774. 
221 See id. 
222 See Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 774-75. 
223 See id. at 775. 
224 See id. at 770-71; Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 876-77 (La. Ct. App. 
1989); supra Section IV.B. 
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upheld in Mullins granted officers of the DEQ the authority to con-
duct warrantless inspections where exigent circumstances exist.225 
"Exigent circumstances" was defined to include those situations which 
pose an imminent threat of harm to the environment.226 Once the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal found the statutory scheme constitutional, 
the court upheld several warrantless inspections made pursuant to 
the statute's exigency clause.227 The outcome of Mullins demonstrates 
judicial willingness to uphold warrantless searches on grounds of immi-
nent danger to the environment, at least where the premises in-
spected were part of a facility in a highly regulated industry, and 
where statutory authority to search existed.228 
In Ohio v. Denune, however, there was no reference to a statute 
authorizing the warrantless inspection of the Dixie Distributing, Inc. 
trailer.229 Although the handling of PCBs is certainly a highly regu-
lated industry, the investigator in Denune did not point to a statutory 
justification for his search.230 Perhaps this lack of statutory authority 
contributed to the court's unwillingness to uphold Inspector Palmer's 
search. A statutory mandate might make courts more willing to uphold 
warrantless searches based on an environmental exigency. Courts, 
however, traditionally have not required statutory authorization as a 
prerequisite for upholding warrantless searches.231 Every exception 
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was created by the 
judicial branch.232 There is simply no precedent for a court's insisting 
that legislatures take the lead in fashioning exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.233 
C. Judicial Willingness to Protect the Environment at the 
Potential Expense of Individual Privacy Interests 
Whether imminent harm to the environment ever will be recog-
nized as an exigency that justifies a warrantless search, will depend, 
to a large extent, on judicial willingness to make protection of the 
225 See Mullins, 549 So.2d at 875-76. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. at 877. 
228 See id. 
229 See Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), em. denied, _ U.S._, 
114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
230 See id. 
231 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 877-952. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
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environment a priority as Congress and state legislatures have already 
done.234 However, one function of the judiciary is to check legislative 
attempts to infringe constitutionally protected rights.235 A potential 
problem with expanding the exigent circumstances exception in the 
manner suggested is that such an expansion arguably involves placing 
environmental concerns over an individual's privacy interests. 
U sing the exigent circumstances exception to allow environmental 
investigators and police to enter premises where they have (1) requi-
site probable cause to search, and (2) a reasonable suspicion that 
imminent harm to the environment is threatened, however, is not an 
undue infringement on individual privacy interests. First, the searches 
upheld under these conditions would necessarily be reasonable-the 
probable cause and exigency requirements ensure that.236 Both of 
these factors must be present before a court will uphold a warrantless 
search based on exigent circumstances.237 
Even searches that satisfy both the probable cause and exigency 
requirements, moreover, will be scrutinized to determine whether the 
searches were narrow enough in scope.238 Courts have made clear that 
the exigent circumstances exception will not be used to allow police 
to run rampant and directionless on private property.239 Rather, when 
234 See Matter of Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 876 (La. Ct. App. 1989); see also 
supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text. 
235 See GERARD GUNTHER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-20 (12th ed. 1991) (citing Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803». 
236 See Annual Review, supra note 6, at 909 ("To justify a warrantless search under the exigent 
circumstances exception, the police must demonstrate that the search was conducted in a 
reasonable manner."). Further, to be protectable, an individual's privacy interest must be 
reasonable. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987). One could argue that stepping 
in the way of agents seeking to prevent an environmental catastrophe that threatens human 
health and safety is not reasonable. See David G. Gray, "Then the Dog Died": The Fourth 
Amendment and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 
646 (1994). 
237 See, e.g., Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (warrantless search 
invalid where officers failed to establish requisite probable cause or an ''imminent'' enough 
threat to constitute an exigency), cm. denied, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 289 (1993). 
238 See, e.g., Annual Review, supra note 6, at 908 (noting warrantless searches for fleeing 
suspects only will be upheld on ground of exigency if their scopes are limited to preventing 
suspect from resisting arrest or from escaping). 
239 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (stating that a warrantless search must be 
"strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation"); Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (''Where exceptions 
are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular situations, those exceptions must be no 
broader than necessitated by the circumstances presented."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-19 
(1967) ("A search that is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by 
virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope .... The scope of the search must be strictly tied to 
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upholding searches based on exigent circumstances, courts have in-
sisted that each search be narrowly limited to matters reasonably 
related to the exigent condition.240 
Cases in which investigators are faced with a substantial threat to 
the environment, moreover, often will involve facilities that are sub-
ject to numerous environmental regulations. Participants in perva-
sively regulated industries cannot reasonably expect that their prem-
ises will be free from the periodic intrusions of inspectors. Thus, their 
privacy interests are less substantial than those of other citizens.241 
Both legislatures and courts have recognized that protecting the en-
vironment at the expense of these "lesser" privacy interests is not an 
illogical or unreasonable endeavor.242 
Where the premises searched are not within a pervasively regu-
lated industry, however, an individual's interest in privacy might ar-
guably supersede the state's interest in protecting the environment. 
In such circumstances, one could contend that protecting non-human 
concerns at the expense of a constitutionally guaranteed right to 
privacy is absurd.243 
However, there are two flaws in that argument. First, the argument 
assumes that the Fourth Amendment guarantees to all people a right 
to be free from any intrusions of privacy. The Fourth Amendment, 
however, does not articulate any explicit right of privacy.244 Rather, 
the Fourth Amendment asserts a guarantee against "unreasonable" 
searches and seizures.245 Any privacy interest derived from the Fourth 
and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."); Matter of Mullins 
& Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 877 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (praising a Louisiana statute authorizing 
warrantless entries made under exigent circumstances because the statute limited the scope of 
inspections to matters reasonably related to the exigent condition). 
240 See supra note 239 and accompanying text; see, e.g., United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 
1271, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a search narrowly tailored to the elimination of a fire 
hazard). 
241 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699--703 (1987). 
242 See id.; Mullins, 549 So.2d at 876 (upholding a Louisiana statute authorizing warrantless 
inspections within a highly regulated oil-processing industry). 
243 See Gray, supra note 236, at 646 ("An imminent or inherent threat to public health or safety 
seems an appropriate basis on which to justify the limitation of Fourth Amendment rights. To 
maintain rigidly a privacy interest so as to thwart reasonable, necessary measures to safeguard 
human health and safety stretches (if it does not actively defy) human reason."). Accepting 
Gray's argument in this context requires acknowledgment that an imminent environmental 
catastrophe qualifies as a threat to human health or safety. See infra notes 248-55 and accom-
panying text. 
244 See U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. IV. 
245 [d. 
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Amendment extends only so far as attempts to intrude on that inter-
est are "unreasonable."246 As noted above, the safeguards built into 
the exigent circumstances exception virtually guarantee that only 
those searches proven to be reasonable will be upheld.247 
The second flaw in the argument is that it assumes that protection 
of the environment is a non-human concern, which should be ''trumped'' 
by the human interest in privacy. Protecting the environment, how-
ever, is a human concern.248 Preserving the environment is in fact vital 
to the present and future health of the human race.249 
Even though the relationship between environmental degradation 
and specific human health problems is difficult to prove, a general 
nexus between levels of pollution and human health seems indisput-
able.250 Environmental pollution has been linked to such illnesses as 
lung cancer,251 childhood leukemia,252 and a variety of infections, skin 
disorders, gastrointestinal problems, genito-urinary problems, and 
cardiac problems.253 Many of the harmful effects of toxic pollution, 
moreover, are not yet fully understood. Some toxic chemicals, once 
spilled, persist in the environment for years, even after attempts at 
remediation have been made.254 The cost of remediating a toxic spill 
after a spill occurs, moreover, is usually staggering.255 
Allowing authorities limited entry onto private property where 
such authorities reasonably believe environmental harm is imminent 
246 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (stating that Constitution does not forbid all searches 
and sei2ures, but only unreasonable searches and sei2ures); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 
(1961) (describing Fourth Amendment as a constitutional documentation of the right to privacy 
from "unreasonable state intrusion"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of 
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." 
(emphasis added». 
247 See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text. 
248 See PLATER, supra note 191, at 1034-39. 
249 See id. 
250 See John Forstrom, Victim Without a Cause: The Missing Link Between Compensation 
and Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 ENVTL. L. 151, 155-56 (1987); see, e.g., PLATER, supra note 191, 
at 95-97, 193-95, 199-203, 760 (outlining links between human health problems and exposures 
to asbestos, the pesticide Paraquat, polluted drinking water, and polluted air). 
251 See PLATER, supra note 191, at 93-97 (detailing effects of asbestos exposure). 
262 See id. at 199-203 (discussing disorders caused by polluted drinking water). 
253 See id. at 760 (listing effects of polluted air). 
264 See id. at 930 (noting that EPA considers tendency of a chemical to bioaccumulate when 
identifying materials as "hazardous" under RCRA); see also Forstrom, supra note 250, at 156 
(discussing human health risks associated with toxic substances in general); Starr, supra note 
146, at 388 (discussing tendency of PCBs to bioaccumulate). 
255 See PLATER, supra note 191, at 896-97 (discussing cost of CERCLA cleanups). 
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is more than rational. Such proaction is essential to preserve the 
delicate ecosystem that sustains human life.256 To enforce individual 
interests in privacy against reasonable attempts to prevent the immi-
nent degradation of the environment is to risk the health and happi-
ness of our successors selfishly and unnecessarily.257 When balancing 
the well-being of future generations against a single individual's de-
sire to secure personal property against every intrusion, no matter 
how reasonable, the only logical conclusion is that the former interest 
should prevail. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Preventing harm to the environment has become a global concern. 
Congress and state legislatures already have taken steps to stop 
environmental degradation before serious damage occurs. The time 
has come for courts to follow suit. Recognizing imminent harm to the 
environment as an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless entry 
onto private premises is a viable means by which the judicial branch 
might increase proactive protection of the environment. 
Any search encompassed by the exigent circumstances exception 
must be supported by requisite probable cause and must be reason-
able. Such safeguards guarantee that the expansion contemplated will 
pose no danger of undue infringement on constitutionally guaranteed 
privacy rights. Rather, expanding the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to include efforts to prevent imminent harm to the environment 
will allow investigators in a narrow range of circumstances to enter 
a premises for the limited purpose of forestalling imminent environ-
mental harm. Considering the minimal intrusiveness of such entries, 
and the enormous clean-up costs, permanent environmental damage, 
and potential adverse effects on human health that could be pre-
vented by allowing such entries, the only logical conclusion is that 
courts should add "harm to the environment" to the list of imminent 
dangers already recognized as exigencies justifying a warrantless 
search. 
256 See id. at 1034-39. 
257 See id. at 1038-39 (discussing this idea under the title "The Common Heritage of Human-
kind"), 
